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GOVERNMENT STRATEGIES FOR SUPPORTING THE ADULT WORKER 




Purpose – This article explores the link between defamilisation studies and studies of the adult 
worker model and discusses the mixed implications that government strategies for supporting 
the adult worker model have for defamilisation. The adult worker model emphasizes that all 
adult men and women ought to engage in formal employment; defamilisation studies stress the 
importance of enhancing women’s chances of choosing (not) to perform important family roles 
such as the receiver of financial support and the care provider.  
Design/methodology/approach – Two new strategies (‘condition building’ and 
‘rewarding/penalizing’) for promoting the adult worker model are identified based on literature 
review; their empirical significance is explored through an examination of comparative data 
concerning early childhood education and care policies (ECEC) and reforms in pension age in 
fourteen countries.   
Findings – The evidence shows that promoting the adult worker model does not necessarily 
benefit all women. While the fourteen countries provide ECEC to varying extents, the increase 
in pension age in most countries shows that governments adopt a ‘rewarding/penalizing’ 
strategy for promoting the adult worker model by allocating major welfare based on people’s 
labour force participation. These pension reforms may generate a negative impact on women’s 
chances of attaining financial autonomy.  
Originality/value – This study presents two new strategies for promoting the adult worker 
model and shows the empirical significance of these strategies based on comparative data. It 
also highlights the importance of searching for alternative concepts, namely economic 
defamilisation, for guiding pension reforms.  
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INTRODUCTION 
This article is concerned with the link between the studies of defamilisation and the studies of 
the adult worker model.  Both types of the studies stress the importance of searching for diverse 
ways of organising adult life, which serve as alternatives to the practices endorsed by the male-
breadwinner model. The male-breadwinner model emphasizes that men should earn financial 
resources by participating in the work economy, whereas women should take up most of care 
responsibilities in the family and financially depend on male family members (Lewis and 
Giullari, 2005).  In other words, women are expected to play the role of the care provider and 
the receiver of financial support in the family.  The defamilisation studies raise concerns about 
women’s involuntary participation in unwanted family relationships in society dominated by 
the male-breadwinner model. Therefore, some of these studies stress the importance of 
exploring ways to provide women with the opportunities to choose to perform or not to perform 
the roles of the care provider and the receiver of financial support in the family (Bambra, 2007; 
Kroger, 2011). The studies of the adult worker model are commonly seen to provide challenges 
to the male-breadwinner model.  The adult worker model suggests that both men and women 
should spend most of their adult life in the work economy (Annesley, 2007). The government 
is expected to actively develop strategies to motivate women to join the labour force (Lewis 
and Giullari, 2005; Daly, 2011).   
This article has three objectives. The first is to present two strategies that can be used by the 
government to uphold the adult worker model – the ‘condition building’ and the 
‘rewarding/penalizing’. The second is to show that the implementation of these two strategies 
can have mixed effects on women’s chances of choosing to perform such roles as the receiver 
of financial support and the provider of family care. The third is to demonstrate the empirical 
significance of these strategies, using comparative data concerning early childhood education 
and care policies and reforms in pension age. By meeting these three objectives, this article 
makes contributions to the adult worker model and the defamilisation literature in two ways.  
Firstly, no studies have examined these two strategies before. Secondly, the discussion of these 
strategies draws our attention to the possibility that the government’s attempt to promote the 
adult worker model can have mixed impact on women’s chances of choosing not to take part 
in unwanted family relationships. This article starts by discussing the concepts of 
defamilisation and the adult worker model. It then discusses the comparative data concerning 
early childhood education and care policies and reforms in pension age. We conclude by 
highlighting the lessons learnt from the discussion of the comparative data.  
DEFAMILISATION 
Different defamilisation studies have different foci (Esping-Andersen, 1999; Israel and 
Spannagel, 2018; Korpi, 2000; Leitner, 2003; Lister, 1994; Lohmann and Zagel, 2016; 
McLaughlin and Glendinning, 1994; Saxonberg, 2013).  Bambra (2007) has identified two 
types of defamilisaton studies – stressing the freedom of women and stressing the freedom of 
the family. The first type of defamilisation studies emphasizes the importance of creating 
favourable conditions for women to choose the ways of whether and how to take part in family 
relationships. These studies focus on searching for ways to assist women in seeking financial 
autonomy in the family (Bambra, 2007; Kroger, 2011; Lister, 1997).  In discussing the roles of 
the welfare regimes in promoting defamilisation, Lister (1994, p.37) shares this view:  
‘Welfare regimes might then also be characterized according to the degree to which 
individual adults can uphold a socially acceptable standard of living, independently of 
family relationships, either through paid work or through the social security system’.   
These ideas receive support from other analysts. In studying defamilisation, Taylor-Gooby 
(1996) focuses on how the welfare state supports women to survive as independent workers 
and decreases economic importance of the family in women’s lives. Bambra (2007) stresses 
that defamilisation studies should be concerned with the extent to which women can thrive as 
independent workers and decrease the role of the family in their personal finances. A similar 
view is raised by Kroger (2011, p. 426): ‘women need support from social policy to opt out of 
family and opt to work’.   
The second type of defamilisation studies focuses on the family rather than individuals (Leitner, 
2003; Esping-Andersen, 1999). These studies are concerned with how to reduce the care 
responsibilities borne by the family. Leitner (2003) emphasizes the importance of finding ways 
to unburden the family of its care function. Korpi (2000) measures the type of family support 
provided by different welfare states, rather than the support given specifically to women. 
Esping-Andersen (1999) argues that the concept of defamilisation is about reducing households’ 
welfare and care responsibilities. In response to different foci of the defamilisation studies, 
analysts suggest using different terms to represent different interpretations of defamilisation – 
for example, ‘dedomestication’ and ‘defamilisation’; ‘family-based defamilisation’ and 
‘individual-based defamilisation’; and ‘economic defamilisation’ and ‘care-focused 
defamilisation’ (Kroger, 2011; Lohmann and Zagel, 2016; Yu et al., 2017).  In view of these 
suggestions, we use the terms economic defamilisation and care-focused defamilisation to 
represent two different interpretations of defamilisation – the former stresses women’s 
economic freedom from the family; the latter puts emphasis on family’s freedom from care 
responsibilities. It is reasonable to believe that there is a close connection between a 
government’s attempts to enhance care-focused defamilisation and its attempts to strengthen 
economic defamilisation. Many care providers in the family are women (International Labour 
Organisation, 2018; UN Women, 2019). If the government provides some measures such as 
formal childcare services with the intention of reducing the care responsibilities of the family, 
it may be able to provide women with the opportunities for choosing not to play the role of the 
care provider in the family. As a result, women may have more time to earn a living in the paid 
labour market and achieve a higher degree of financial autonomy in the family. This means 
that women may also gain more resources to choose not to perform the role of the receiver of 
financial support in the family.   
 
ADULT WORKER MODEL 
Given significant demographic and societal changes over the past few decades, including a 
decline in fertility rates and marriage rates and a growing demand for labour flexibility, it is 
commonly believed that the male-breadwinner model plays a less important role in informing 
the design of family policies than before (Ciccia and Bleijenbergh, 2014; Johnson, 2019; Lewis, 
2001). As a result, there is a growing volume of studies of the adult worker model, which 
suggests that both men and women should take part in formal employment (Annesley, 2007; 
Daly, 2011; Larsen, 2005; Lewis and Giullari, 2005; Lewis, et al, 2008).  The adult worker 
model studies are highly related to the EU’s Lisbon Strategy agreed in 2000 and re-launched 
in 2005 (Annesley, 2007).  This Strategy explicitly supports the activation of women. For 
example, it set the target of raising the employment rate of women to 60% by the year 2010 
(European Commission, 2010a).  This strategy is supported by the discussion of other 
international agreements. The Europe 2020 Strategy proposed the target of having 75% of the 
population aged 20-64 employed (European Commission, 2010b). The 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development stresses the importance of creating decent and formal employment 
opportunities for all women and men (United Nations, 2015).    
There are a number of studies about how to uphold the adult worker model (Annesley, 2007; 
Daly, 2011; Lewis and Giullari, 2005; Lewis, 2001; Marceno and Pera, 2017). Most of them 
focus on the roles played by the government in encouraging people to organise their life based 
on the adult worker model. It is possible that the government may try to do so by adopting a 
low intervention approach. By taking as limited action as possible to assist women to become 
workers, this approach gives people hardly any choice but to take part in the work economy in 
order to earn a reasonable living (Lewis and Giullari, 2005). An alternative to the low 
intervention approach is the supported approach.  This approach focuses on supporting people 
(especially women) to reconcile work with care duties (Daly, 2011). This article joins the 
discussion of the role of the government in promoting the adult worker model. It focuses on 
two strategies that the government may use to uphold this model – the ‘condition-building’ and 
the ‘rewarding/penalizing’. The condition-building strategy is indebted to the ideas of the 
supported approach, whereas the rewarding/penalizing approach is to a certain extent related 
to the low intervention approach.  
The condition-building strategy stresses the importance of creating favourable conditions for 
women (and men) to take part in formal employment. Examples of this strategy are the 
provision of formal childcare programmes and vocational training programmes. The former 
serves to outsource the care responsibilities of the family to other sectors and may be able to 
give the care providers in the family (usually women) more time to take part in formal 
employment; the latter may enable women to learn more vocational skills so as to increase their 
employability. Moreover, the provision of these programmes conveys a message that taking 
part in formal employment is a social good. That is why the government uses public resources 
to assist women to participate in formal employment.  
The rewarding/penalizing strategy stresses that the allocation of major welfare to the public is 
based on people’s participation in the work economy. This makes those who are willing and 
able to take part in formal employment the ‘deserving group’ for social welfare and those who 
are unwilling or unable to take part in formal employment the ‘undeserving group’.  Examples 
of this strategy are some pension reform measures implemented in Europe. Many European 
countries have been reforming their pension systems following the concept that assumes stable 
employment in terms of duration and place of work (Frericks et al., 2009; Grady, 2015). They 
not only increase the pension age but also make a long period of contribution to the pension 
scheme a qualifying condition for receiving full pension entitlement. These changes convey a 
message that all people should spend most of the adult life on formal employment.  Moreover, 
for people whose participation in the work economy has frequent interruptions, the chances of 
receiving sufficient pension incomes to secure a decent retirement are undermined (Ginn and 
MacIntyre, 2013; Grady, 2015). Trying to avoid this problem may give people the incentive to 
work longer in the work economy, though the entry into and the exit from the work economy 
are not necessarily within the control of individual workers but are affected by a number of 
factors, such as the availability of decent jobs and job protection measures (Cook, 2018; 
Deeming and Smyth, 2018).  
A government’s attempt to support the adult worker model can have mixed implications for 
women’s opportunities to choose not to perform important family roles. If a government 
implements the condition-building strategy through expanding the provision of formal 
childcare services, it will provide favourable conditions for women to choose not to perform 
the role of the care provider in the family. If a number of female care providers in the family 
choose to use the formal childcare services and use the time saved to earn a living in the paid 
labour market, economic defamilisation can also be enhanced. This also means that women 
have the opportunities to choose not to play the role of the receiver of financial support in the 
family.   
If a government implements the rewarding/penalizing strategy by requiring people to make 
contributions to the pension schemes for a longer period of time before they can be given 
pension incomes, it will increase the difficulties for women with short and/or fragmented career 
to achieve financial autonomy in the family after retirement. In this case, it can be said that the 
rewarding/penalizing strategy can make it difficult for women not to perform the role of the 
receiver of financial support in the family in their later stage of life.     
 
SEARCHING FOR EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
This section is intended to show the empirical significance of the strategies used by 
governments to promote the adult worker model. Using comparative data allows us to show 
the relevance of these strategies to a number of countries. Specifically, to fulfil this purpose, 
we discuss comparative data concerning early childhood education and care (ECEC) and the 
government’s decision on the adjustment to pension age in 14 countries (Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, and the UK), and the implications of these data.  
The 14 countries were chosen for discussion because they are covered by previous 
defamilisation studies (Bambra, 2007; Chau et al., 2017; Esping-Andersen, 1999; Kroger, 
2011). Also, such selection is constrained by the availability of high-quality comparable data 
provided by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2019a, 
2019b, 2020). In order to collect and interpret data, some previous defamilisation studies have 
developed typologies. The advantage of the typology method is that it can make us more aware 
of ideal defamilisation patterns. Moreover, we can compare the similarities and differences 
between the typologies based on the concepts of defamilisation and the typologies based on 
other welfare concepts such as labour decommodification. However, this method has 
weaknesses. Analysts point out that the multiplicity and complexity of the policies involved in 
the typology may render the typologising exercise arbitrary (Saraceno and Keck, 2010). In 
view of this limitation, we have chosen not to classify the 14 countries into different exclusive 
groups based on the concept of defamilisation or the adult worker model. Rather, we focus on 
showing the different degree of importance attached by the 14 countries to two policy measures 
(ECEC and the government’s attempts to adjust the pension age) which have the potential to 
strengthen the adult worker model, and the implications of these measures for the opportunities 
that women have for choosing not to perform the roles of the care provider and the receiver of 
financial support in the family. By doing so, we seek to identify empirical examples to illustrate 
the mixed impact of a government’s attempt to strengthen the adult worker model on 
defamilisation.  
Early Childhood Education and Care 
The provision of ECEC is composed of several formal care and education services, such as 
those provided by day care centres and creches. There are reasons for researchers studying the 
adult worker model to focus on ECEC. In discussing the need for ECEC, international 
organisations such as the European Commission (2009) point out that women’s engagement in 
the labour force is linked to the age of their children, and that women’s withdrawal from formal 
employment could be partly explained by a lack of available provision of care for young 
children. It is commonly believed that if the government is committed to the provision of ECEC, 
it can be useful in reducing the work-life balance challenges faced by working parents. In 
relation to this view, the OECD (2017) stresses that affordable and high quality ECEC can 
contribute to the increase in female labour force participation; and the European Council (2018) 
emphasizes that ECEC can enhance the potential of women with children to participate in the 
labour market.  
Table 1 provides the information about at what age children are guaranteed by public 
authorities a publicly subsidised ECEC place.  Such a policy is commonly seen as the indicator 
of a country’s commitment to the provision of ECEC. For example, the European Union set 
the ‘Barcelona target’ that childcare should be provided for 33% of children under 3 years old 
in the European Union zone in 2002 (European Commission, 2014). While all of the 14 
countries provide ECEC, there are significant differences in the age at which children have a 
guaranteed place in ECEC among them.  Denmark, (0.5 year old), Finland (0.8 year old), 
Germany (1 year old), and Sweden (1 year old) guarantee children an ECEC place when they 
are very young. Austria and the Netherlands guarantee a child an ECEC place only after his/her 
fifth birthday. Ireland does not guarantee an ECEC place for children; children in Ireland 
receive compulsory primary education at the age of 6.   
International organisations such as the European Council (2014) stress that ECEC and 
childcare leave measures are essential parts of the two-pronged approach for supporting 
employed parents in work-family reconciliation. The council recognizes that childcare leave 
measures and ECEC carry out different functions. In the words of the European Commission, 
‘leave policies… enable parents to stay at home to look after their young children’ and ECEC 
services serve to ensure that ‘when parents return to work, good quality care and education is 
available’. Moreover, the European Commission stresses that ‘ensuring synergy and continuity 
between the ECEC and childcare leave measures is very important’. To enhance our 
understanding of ECEC in relation to the development of the adult worker model, we also 
provide information about adequately compensated childcare leave (note 1). As shown in Table 
2, some countries such as Hungary (2 years), Austria (2 years), Sweden (1.1 years), Germany 
(1 year) and Poland (1 year) have greater commitment to the provision of adequately 
compensated childcare leave. Some countries such as the UK (0.1 year), the Netherlands (0.3 
year) and Belgium (0.3 year) are much less committed to the provision of adequately 
compensated childcare leave. Ireland does not provide any adequately compensated childcare 
leave. This information shows the existence of childcare gap, which refers to the amount of 
time childcare is not covered by either childcare leave or a guaranteed place in ECEC. The 
absence of childcare gap means that parents receive strong financial support from the 
government to look after their young children and to outsource childcare to the formal sector 
when they need to go to work. This makes it easier for mothers to reduce their financial reliance 
on other family members and to reduce their responsibilities for taking care of their young 
children. As shown in Table 2, Denmark, Finland, and Sweden have no childcare gap. Ireland 
(6 years) has the largest childcare gap among the 14 countries.   
Pension Reforms 
Apart from ECEC, it is also important for researchers looking into the adult worker model to 
study the government’s decision to adjust the pension age. As a number of countries have 
recently been increasing the pension age (Tinios, et al, 2015), these changes imply that it is not 
uncommon for the government to use the rewarding/penalizing strategy to support the adult 
worker model. In fact, increasing the pension age conveys a message that people should work 
for a longer period of time before seeking any support for pension incomes. This message is 
further reinforced if the government also emphasizes the contribution period as the qualifying 
condition for receiving full state pension. Analysts are concerned that raising the pension age 
puts many women in a disadvantaged position (Grady, 2015).  Given the fact that female labour 
force participation rates are generally lower than male ones (Liam, 2012), some women may 
face a certain period of unemployment before they reach pension age. In this unemployment 
period, they may need to financially rely on their male family members against their wish.  
Table 3 provides the information about the reforms in pension age in the 14 countries. Most of 
them will increase the pension age in the near future. The newly proposed pension age ranges 
from 65 to 67 for women in the 14 countries. Most countries aim to make the pension age for 
women the same as that for men. Some countries (such as France and Belgium) have made a 
long period of work contributions the qualifying condition for receiving full state pension.   
We share the analysts’ concern that women would be disadvantaged by the government’s 
decision to raise the pension age. Such concern is well founded by statistics. Table 4 shows 
that the average male labour force participation rate and female labour force participation rate 
in the age range (25-54) is 91.7 and 82.9 respectively (note 2). Both rates in this age range are 
higher than those in the age range (55-64). It is also noteworthy that there is a difference in the 
labour force participation rate between men and women in the age range 25-54 (8.8). This 
gender difference is even larger in the age range 55-64 (12.4) (note 3). These statistics imply 
that it is not easy for people especially women to take part in formal employment in their later 
stage of life. It is possible that labour force participation rates, including those among older 
women, could significantly increase before a government raises the pension age. However, no 
sign of such drastic change has been seen so far. It is thus reasonable to believe that the 
government’s attempt to raise the pension age and make the standard pension age for women 
the same as that for men is very likely to affect a lot of women, making them prone to poverty 
or giving them no choice but to financially rely on their families.  
Implications of the Findings 
This section highlights four lessons learnt from the discussion of comparative findings 
concerning ECEC policies and pension reforms. The first lesson is concerned with the 
empirical significance of the strategies used by the government to promote the adult worker 
model. As shown above, all of the 14 countries provide ECEC, but at the same time, most of 
them raise the pension age. This implies that most of the 14 countries have used both the 
condition building strategy and the rewarding/penalizing strategy to strengthen the adult 
worker model.  
The second lesson is concerned with the mixed implications of the adult worker model on 
women’s chances of choosing not to perform certain family roles. The male-breadwinner 
model has long been criticized for giving women limited choice about how to organise their 
adult life (Grady, 2015; Marceno and Pera, 2017). In societies dominated by this model, women 
are expected to spend most of their time on providing care in the family rather than taking part 
in formal employment. Without the chance of earning a living in the labour market, women 
may have no choice but to financially rely on men. They may, in turn, lack sufficient bargaining 
power over the allocation of care responsibilities in the family. As an alternative to the male-
breadwinner model, upholding the adult worker model may give women more control over 
their life. Firstly, it recognizes the potential of women, including that of women with children, 
to take part in formal employment. Secondly, the government may provide measures, such as 
those aimed at enhancing ECEC, to assist women to take part in the work economy (Giullari 
and Lewis, 2006). With more financial resources in hand, women may have a greater say about 
how to organise their life in the family. However, as discussed above, the positive effects of 
putting the adult worker model into practice on women’s welfare should not be overestimated. 
The rewarding/penalizing strategy for promoting the adult worker model can have a more 
negative impact on women’s chances of receiving social welfare (such as pension incomes) 
compared with that on men’s. In other words, the gender gap in terms of access to social welfare 
can be widened. This may lead to women’s financial reliance on men in the family in their later 
stage of life, and undermine their ability to bargain over their preferred ways of organising their 
life in the family.  
The third lesson is concerned with the reciprocal relationship between government policies and 
policy conditions. On the one hand, government policies can play an important role in shaping 
the underlying political, economic, and social conditions. For example, by outsourcing the care 
responsibilities from the family to the public sector, the government may be able to give the 
family care providers (usually women) more time to take part in formal employment. This may, 
in turn, increase women’s participation in the labour force. On the other hand, the impact of 
government policies on people’s life is affected by the underlying political, economic, and 
social conditions. For example, while the government can set the years of participation in the 
labour market as the precondition for accessing public pension, the extent to which this policy 
affects people’s life largely depends on men’s and women’s actual participation in the labour 
force. Given relatively low female labour force participation, this pension policy will severely 
undermine women’s chances of having sufficient pension incomes in their later life. In fact, 
despite the policy aimed at encouraging formal employment, women’s participation in the 
labour market continues to be affected by a number of political, economic, and social factors, 
such as the influence of social norms regarding the gender division of labour in the family and 
the conditions of the labour market (such as the availability of well-paid jobs for women and 
sex discrimination) (Addati, et al, 2018; Lewis and Giullari, 2005). Moreover, it is noteworthy 
that there is a time lag between the implementation of the policy and the changes brought by 
it. In theory, if the government raises the pension age, it may make more people feel the need 
to stay in formal employment longer; otherwise, people may fail to get sufficient resources to 
maintain their standard of living. Nevertheless, there is no guarantee that people are able to 
prolong their work life immediately after the government raises the pension age. In other words, 
there can be a large time gap between the implementation of the government policy on the 
pension age and the adjustment that people are able to make. Those who fail to make the 
adjustment during this time gap become vulnerable to economic difficulties. In order to prevent 
people from suffering from the time lag, it is prudent for the government to put its policy ideas 
into practice only after the policy condition becomes favourable. Following this logic, the 
government should consider raising the pension age after ensuring that both men and women 
are given ample opportunity to take part in formal employment and to extend their work life.  
The fourth lesson is concerned with the importance of using the concept of economic 
defamilisation to guide the formulation of pension reform measures. Given that the pension 
reforms with the emphasis on the adult worker model may not necessarily benefit women, it is 
worth exploring whether it is desirable to develop pension reforms based on alternative 
concepts, such as economic defamilisation. As mentioned in the introduction, economic 
defamilisation stresses women’s economic freedom from their family. To achieve economic 
defamilisation, we need to create favourable conditions for encouraging women to take part in 
formal employment. At the same time, it is equally important to assist women in accessing the 
state pension scheme. The idea of economic defamilisation can provide justification for the 
search for alternative pension reform measures, such as lowering the pension age with 
reference to the female labour force participation rate in each country and significantly 
increasing the pension credits so as to support women (and men) who choose to take part in 
the family as care providers.  
 
CONCLUSION  
This article is concerned with the link between the defamilisation debate and the study of the 
adult worker model. Based on the comparative data concerning ECEC policies and reforms in 
pension age, it explores the implications of the strategies that can be used by the government 
to support the adult worker model for defamilisation. Our discussion of the findings has shown 
that promoting the adult worker model does not necessarily benefit all women. As shown above, 
even though the government expects women to spend their adult life on the formal employment, 
there is no guarantee that women are able to do so. And for this reason, we have stressed the 
importance of searching for alternative concepts, such as economic defamilisation, for guiding 
pension reforms.  
As the last part of this article, it is necessary to stress that it is not easy to put the idea of 
economic defamilisation into practice. The government is expected not only to assist women 
to participate in formal employment but also to provide sufficient welfare for people who 
choose not to work. Despite the challenges involved in implementing economic defamilisation, 
it is worth drawing attention to this concept. Firstly, the discussion of this concept makes us 
more aware of the importance of helping women to achieve financial autonomy in the family 
in order to challenge gender inequality in the private and public spheres. Secondly, it serves to 
challenge the view that helping women to take part in the work economy is the only possible 
way to promote gender equality and/or increase women’s freedom from the family.   
Future studies can build on our discussion of the implications of the strategies for promoting 
the adult worker model for economic defamilisation. It is worth exploring how the 
implementation of the adult worker model affects the life of specific groups, such as single 
parents, part-time female workers, and women in midlife. For example, we can compare and 
analyze their experiences of the ways in which the implementation of the condition-building 
and rewarding/penalizing strategies affects their chances of achieving the degree of economic 
defamilisation that they prefer.  
 
Table 1 Starting Age for receiving an ECEC place (by legal entitlement/compulsory  
              regulation) 
Country Starting age 
Australia 5 years old 
Belgium 2.5 years old 
Denmark 0.5 year old 
Finland 0.8 year old 
France 3 years old 
Germany 1 year old 
Hungary 3 years old 
*Ireland 6 years old 
Netherlands 5 years old 
Poland 3 years old 
Portugal 4 years old 
Spain 3 years old 
Sweden 1 year old 
UK 3 years old 
Mean 2.9 years old 
Remark: Ireland does not guarantee an ECEC place for children; children in Ireland receive 
compulsory primary education at the age of 6.  
Source: European Commission, 2019 
 
Table 2 Childcare Leave 




Australia 1.2 years 3.8 years 
Belgium 0.3 year 2.2 years 
Denmark 0.5 year 0 year 
Finland 0.9 year 0 year 
France 0.3 year 2.7 years 
Germany 1 year 0 year 
Hungary 2 years 1 year 
*Ireland 0 year 6 years 
Netherlands 0.3 year 4.7 years 
Poland 3 years 2 years 
Portugal 1 year 3.5 years 
Spain 0.4 year 2.6 years 
Sweden 1.1 year 0 year 
UK 0.1 year 2.9 year 
Mean 0.86 year 2.24 years 
Source: European Commission, 2019 
 
Table 3: Adjustment in Pension Age and Related Changes 
Country Pension age Remark 
Austria  
 
65 for men and 60 for women -The retirement age for women will 
increase from 60 to 65 between 2024 
and 2033.  
Belgium 
 
65 -The pension age will be increased to 66 
in 2025 and further to 67 in 2030.  
-A full public pension benefit requires 
45 career years.  
Denmark 
 
65  - The pension age will be increased 
gradually to 67 years in the period 
2019-22 and to 68 in 2030.   
- A full public old-age pension 
requires 40 years of residence.  
Finland 
 
- The national old-age 
pension is payable from 
the age of 65.  





A full-rate public pension 
requires either one of the two 
conditions:  
a) minimum contributory 
record (41.5 years for 
people born in 1957, who 
can retire at the legal age 
of 62 in 2019) and the 
minimum legal pension 
age (62 years for people 
born in 1957) 
The age of the full-rate pension will 
be increased from 65 to 67. 
Country Pension age Remark 
b) to be aged at least 67 (for 
people born in 1957) 
Germany 
 
- The regular old-age 
pension is payable from 
the age of 65 and 
six/seven months 
-For those born in 1964, the statutory 
retirement age will be 67. 
Hungary 
 
The standard retirement age is 
63.5. 
 
- The pension age will be increased to 
65 in 2022 
- 20 years of service is required for 
both the earning-related pension and 
minimum pension.  
Ireland 
 
The state pension is payable 
from the age of 66.  
 
- The age will be increased to 67 in 
2021 and 68 in 2028.  
- A person is required to have 40 
years of worth or contribution to 
receive the full rate.  
Netherlands 
 
The basic old-age pension is 
payable from the age of 66  
 
- The statutory pension age will be 
gradually increased to 67 in 2021.  




The pension age is 65 for men 
and 60 for women.  
-The pension age will be increased to 67 
for both sexes.  
Portugal  
 
The normal age of retirement 
with an old age is 66 years 
and 4 months in 2018.  
 
- The normal age of retirement can be 
reduced by four months for each 
year of contribution exceeding 40 
years when the beneficiary turns 65 
years old.  
Spain 
 
The retirement age for a full 
pension benefit is 65 years 
and six months.   
- If an individual has 38.5 years of 
contribution, retirement with full 
pension benefits is available from 
the age of 65.  
- The legal retirement age will be 67 
years in 2027.  
Sweden 
 
Eligibility for the guarantee 
pension requires three years 
of residency and the 
guarantee pension benefit is 
available from the age of 65.  
- A maximum guarantee pension 






State pension age is 66 
 
- The pension age will be increased to 
67 between 2026 and 2028.  
- 30 years of National Insurance 
Pension contribution is required for 
full basic state pension.  
Source: OECD, 2019a. 
 
Table 4 Labour Force Participation Rates in Different Age Groups 
















Austria 60.3 92.4 65.6 52.5 85.7 47.4 
Belgium 32.5 89.3 59.8 29.5 80.3 48.9 
Denmark 60.5 90.1 78.3 61.8 82.8 69.0 
Finland 56.8 90.3 70.5 53.6 84.9 72.4 
France 39.8 91.9 59.4 34.0 83.1 54.6 
Germany 54.2 92.7 79.4 48.4 83.3 70.0 
Hungary 37.2 93.4 70.6 26.9 80.6 47.2 
Ireland 48.2 90.6 72.1 45.9 76.6 55.0 
Netherland
s 
69.7 91.5 81.0 70.3 83.3 63.1 
Poland 39.2 91.5 62.6 31.0 79.0 40.0 
Portugal 36.1 92.7 70.9 32.5 88.0 58.8 
Spain 39.3 91.7 69.2 34.3 82.3 54.4 
Sweden 53.6 93.6 84.2 55.9 88.7 79.0 
UK 61.9 92.0 73.3 60.0 81.5 63.1 
Mean 49.2 91.7 71.2 45.5 82.9 58.8 





1. The total length of childcare leave takes into account all the different types of leave 
(maternity, paternity, and parental leave) and is calculated from the child’s birth until 
both parents return to work. Leave is considered to be adequately compensated if 
parents receive at least 65% of their previous earnings during this period (European 
Commission, 2019).  
 
2. The labour force participation rate is calculated as the labour force divided by the total 
working-age population. The working age population refers to people aged 15-64.  
 
3. Finland is the only country where the female labour force participation rate is higher 
than the male labour force participation rate in the age group 55-64.  
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